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Abstract
Federalism is a political mechanism for promoting unity-
in-diversity in a heterogeneous society. The federal system 
through the IGR uses the IGM mechanism to provide 
understanding, cordiality balance and collaboration 
between and among units of government, and between 
government and the citizenry. In Nigeria’s federal 
relation, the IGR seems not to have facilitated the right 
harmonious interactions between and among the various 
units of government, and among groups. This has resulted 
in continued conflict and disharmony in some important 
areas of federal relation with its negative impact on the 
citizenry and the federal state. Hence this paper utilizing 
the documentary method examines the utilization of the 
IGM practice from 1999-2007 in IGR interactions in some 
areas of government interface in our federal system. 
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INTRODUCTION
Federalism capsules heterogeneity with its appendage 
of complexities. It is designed to accommodate different 
units of government, diversity of social institutions 
and cultural formation that do not suit in fittingly or 
are easily amenable to a unitary system. It is a political 
organizational container concept that accommodates 
contrast and it is capable of responding and adjusting 
rightly to the variegate needs of group complexities and 
diversity with less dislocations if properly managed. 
That is why the federal system is favored by scholars 
and students alike to meet the demand for national unity 
for the whole, while at the same time allow individual 
communal groups to maintain their identity that is distinct 
from that of the whole. Evidently, federalism symbolizes a 
political philosophy of promoting diversity-in-unity with 
decentralization serving as its standing pillar. 
Decentralization creates space for the devolution 
of power to subnational units. It provides the space for 
continued adjustment, compromise, and integration 
ofdivergent groups interest for better policy making, 
implementation and fiscal allocation. This is a necessary 
yet challenging process. It is challenging because the 
needs of the various groups are diverse and conflicting but 
represents their individually preferred interest for which 
they are not willing to compromise. And if need be, these 
individual variegated group interest must be reflected in the 
national development agenda. Remolding and balancing 
those diverse interest into a single policy framework for 
national action without undermining any group’s values 
requires adopting and utilizing the right mechanism that 
will confront, manage and resolve the challenges that do 
arise in the complex and challenging process of joint policy 
making, fiscal allocation and program implementation. 
The mechanism that makes this complex balancing 
possible is the IGM working within the framework of the 
IGR. The ability to capture diverse interests and balance 
appropriately into the national policy agenda makes 
federalism a distinctive paradigm of organization geared 
towards resolving the systemic contradiction of its distinct 
collectivities (Bassey, 2005, p. 29).
The IGR interactions subsumes four distinctive 
areas of federal-state-local interactions which are: a) 
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intergovernmental fiscal relations; b) intergovernmental 
administrative relations; c) intergovernmental social 
services delivery; d) intergovernmental legislative 
jurisdictional relations. The essence offense IGR is to 
facilitate engagement and involvement of all the units 
in the process of national planning such that harmony 
between the various groups is not compromised. 
Specifically, the IGR is an important arena of activities 
or interactions between governmental units of all types 
and levels within the federal system (Anderson, 1960, 
p.3; Adamolekun, 1983, p.89). It encompasses all the 
permutations and combinations of relations that occur 
between the various units of government. It is the platform 
that allows different actors the opportunity for continuing 
dialogue on issues of group importance leading to the 
balancing of the policy table in a manner that promotes 
national progress. By this instrument, federalism is able to 
bring the people and their institutions together to manage 
their socio-economic and political differences coherently 
towards national development in a collective spirit with 
less strain.
Federa l i sm subsumes  the  IGR and the  IGM 
mechanism. They are the grease that lubricates the 
complex wheel of interactions that transpire daily 
between the divergent groups and their institutions in 
a federal state. These daily interactions are not without 
their strains and differences that are likely to result in 
conflict. However, it is the IGM working through the 
IGR that ensures that the federal system is able to resolve 
amicably the disagreements that do arise from groups 
and institutional interactions. IGM is the management 
and coordination of relationships between and among 
governments for the purpose of achieving specific policy 
goal (Henry, 2007, p.349). The tools of the IGM include 
dialogue, negotiation, bargaining, consensus-building, 
compromise and collaboration. 
In a federal system, the IGM offers groups and 
institutions of the state, between groups and the state, 
and between institutions of the state the platform for 
interactions, adjustments and readjustments of interest 
and demands using the tools of the IGM. The process of 
adjustments and readjustments of interest and demands is 
consummated through continuous negotiation, bargaining, 
consensus-building and compromise among diverse 
groups. The IGM as a dominant theme in IGR literature; 
it is aimed at broadening cooperation, coordination, 
and collaboration between all the interest groups in 
a federal state. These tools for interactions represent 
genuine avenues for identifying and mitigating conflicts 
that often impede or slow down the process of quick 
policy making, fiscal allocation and implementation for 
national development. Using documented sources, the 
object of this paper is to examine the utilization of the 
IGM mechanism from 1999 to 2007 in some key areas of 
governance in Nigeria. 
1.  INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS: 
ABSTRACTION, DIMENSIONS AND 
DYNAMICS 
The I.G.R. is a system of transaction among managers in a 
hierarchically structured level of government. In a federal 
state, the IGR covers four distinctive areas which are: 
National-state-local, state-state, extra-governmental and 
non-governmental bodies’ interactions in a federal system. 
These four areas identified above mirror both the vertical 
and horizontal pattern of interaction within a federal state 
with public interest objectives (Olugbemi, 1980, p.11; 
Ayoade, 1980; Zimmerman, 1996; Galligan, et al. 1991; 
Ikelegbe, 2004). It is instructive to observe that we cannot 
talk about the IGR without emphasizing the important 
role of non-governmental (NGOs) in the policy process. 
Given the involvement of NGOs in the policy process the 
term IGR seems a bit outdated perhaps an inclusive term 
like inter-organizational relations should be apt (Denhardt 
& Denhardt, 2009, p.109). Central to the I.G.R theme, 
there are three models that feature prominently which are: 
Coordinate authority, inclusive authority and overlapping 
authority also referred to as partnership, principal/agent or 
the dual model (Bello-Imam, 2004, p.92). 
Nigeria’s federalism capsules four distinct political 
decision making point  (federal ,  s tate  and local 
governments). In order to reduce conflict, engender 
peaceful cooperation and facilitate the development of the 
various subnational units without compromising national 
progress intergovernmental relations and management 
is not only germane but imperative. The Nigerian 
federal structure comprises of a central government, 
a federal capital territory (Abuja), 36 states and 774 
local governments. Within this structure, sits different 
forms of relations comprising of federal-state-local, 
federal-state, state-state, state-local and local-local. The 
network of interactions between and among units of 
government and between government and NGOs is vast. 
These identified network of relationship interact through 
meetings, some of those meeting are conducted formally 
while others are informal. Formally, it is conducted 
through, the Federal Executive Council, National 
Council of States, Federal Character Commission, The 
National Council on Education and Health). The National 
Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission 
(NRMAFC), National Boundary Commission, National 
Planning Commission, the Court, and the Legislature.
The evident character of these vast networks of 
interactions is complexity. Complexity is evident due to 
the marked difference between units which necessitate the 
need for collaboration between and among the different 
levels of government in Nigeria. Collaboration is a 
cooperative arrangement in which two or more parties 
sharing of know-how work jointly towards common goal. 
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Collaboration is effective when the parties involved have 
compatible goals. The major areas of collaboration are: 
Fiscal allocation, projects and program planning, policy 
determination, project and program distribution, and 
implementation. These choices are jointly made to ensure 
that all groups have a feel of national presence in their 
communities in accordance to minimum national standard 
(Ikelegbe, 2004; Aiyede, 2005).
In Nigeria, the unilateral usurpation and reshuffling of 
functions by the central government and the use of unfair 
fiscal allocation criteria or principles during military 
authoritarian regimes of past years had significantly 
undermined the value of the IGR and IGM in the 
working of the federal system (Aiyede, 2005, p.223). 
The centralizing character of military governing pattern 
that occasioned the oscillation and fragrant usurpation 
of responsibility without due recourse to the IGR and 
IGM mechanism had resulted in fiscal disequilibrium and 
functional dislocation of subnational units to be effective. 
This dislocation in the conduct federal relations not with-
standing the I.G.R still is the workhorse of any federal 
system. It is the privileged instrument by which the job-
whatever the job-gets done (Cameroun, 2001, p. 121). 
Given normal circumstances, there are five issue-areas in 
Nigeria’s federalism that reinforce the value of the IGR 
and IGM as essential instrument for the working of our 
federal system. These issue-areas are: The prominence of 
policy network, inclusion of all concerned governmental 
entities in projects and program implementation, attitudes 
and actions of implementing officials, the necessity of 
regular continuous day-to-day interaction among policy 
implementing and monitoring public officials, such as 
administrators and elected officials.
The ability of the IGR via the IGM to birth a 
productive engaging cooperative group effort in a 
seemingly discordant circumstance that earns these 
tow mechanisms their dynamic character to facilitate 
the proper working of federalism. Hence, the IGR is a 
structure of interaction that is conditioned by events, 
developments, situations and other transient factors one 
primarily to federalism (Bello-Imman, 1995; Bello-Imman 
1996, p.92). If the IGR is properly ordered and utilized it 
has the resilience to regulate and balance relationships and 
interactions despite considerable sharing of jurisdictions, 
shared action, programmes and problem-solution (Watt, 
1970). The I.G.R is a mechanism for resolving conflict 
that often emerge the process of planning, distribution, 
financing and execution of programs and project in the 
polity. For the IGR to engender harmony and balance 
necessary for the achievement of the fundamental goals 
and objectives of statehood will require the adoption 
and utilization of an integrative managerial approach of 
the IGR which the IGM command (Popola, 2006, p.1; 
Marando & Florestano, 1998, p. 288). 
2 .   I N T E R G O V E R N M E N T A L 
M A N A G E M E N T  ( I G M ) :  M E A N I N G , 
CHARACTER AND ISSUES FOR A 
FEDERAL STATE
The IGM mechanism is exercised within the IGR 
framework in a federal State. It is within this framework 
that the meaning, element, and value of the IGM can 
be understood and better appreciated. Though it is 
subsumed by the IGR its operation and impact has far 
reaching consequences for the federal state. IGM is the 
management and coordination of the relationships between 
governments for the purpose of achieving specific policy 
goal (Henry, 2007, p.349). It is the process by which the 
specified objectives are met (Marando & Florestano, 
1992, p.296). The IGM is an emerging concept in the 
study of governmental interactions with specific emphasis 
on public officials, who work at the margin between their 
governments (Wright, 2007, p.508). Although they are 
not involve in deciding policy issues, they are however 
responsible for managing policy decisions and the daily 
fallouts that arise from governmental interactions. 
The IGM mechanism provides administrators and 
groups the means and methods to resolve the issues that 
arise from group interaction in policy and programme 
design, and implementation. It is a vital instrument 
because diverse groups come to the policy table with 
different expectations for which if inappropriately 
attended to results in group discontent and conflict. This is 
essential because, for every policy issue there is a contest 
over conflicting, though equally plausible, conception 
of the same abstract goal or value for which the task of 
policy makers is to ‘reveal and clarify the underlying 
value disputes so that people can see where they differ 
and move toward reconciliation’ [Stone as cited in Bryner 
(2007, p.193)]. It is by performing this function that the 
IGM methodology permits the bridging of the political 
and administrative differences that often prolong or delay 
decision making and implementation. 
Giving the finance challenge of the state and its 
impeding her ability to cope with growing public 
demands; self-help and voluntary actions are key 
elements for a successful society, and that government 
should be wary of eroding the potentials for such action 
(Beveridge, 1940). Hence, the IGM mechanism is able 
to facilitate inclusion of private hands in public policy-
making, budgeting and implementation that allows the 
federal state to move progressively with a single focus 
toward achieving her national development agenda with 
less distortion and conflicts. Arising from this value-
added character, the federal system derives the advantage 
of cost savings, fiscal easement, personnel easement, 
experimentation, lower political risk, image enhancement, 
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greater  leverage,  emergency management ,  cost 
clarification, and economic development (Henry, 2007, p. 
305). Even though, integrating the various groups’ needs 
into the national agenda in inter-jurisdictional relations 
is becoming increasingly complex due differences in 
interest the IGM arguably has the capacity to narrow the 
differences between generally stated policies and specific 
problems that differ by location circumstances (Marando 
& Florestano, 1992, pp. 287-288).
Drawing a distinct boundary between IGM and 
IGR behaviour is not only tenuous but subjective. 
Yet, the IGM covers such areas as; multijurisdictional 
decision-making, the various mixes between central 
and constituent authority, inter-personnel organizational 
networking, and the reliance on government and non-
governmental approach to problem resolution. It also 
include units involve authority relationship, means 
of conflict resolution, values, political quotient, and 
leading actors (Wright, 2007, p.512). Albeit, the IGM 
mechanism focus at problem solving, coping capabilities 
and networking; these three elements also double as 
common terms used in defining IGM. The forces that 
have necessitated a working IGM methodology in a 
federal system are: a) increase in boundary spanning 
activities; b) new management skills required as a result 
of the boundary spanning activities, and c) international 
expression of these changes requiring a substantial dose 
of behavioural domain Wright (2007, p.514) expressed 
via negotiation, and bargaining for resolving contending 
issues (Radin, 2007, pp.366-375). 
Theoretically, the predominantly descriptive and 
analytical nature of IGR is inadequate to convey the 
result focus emphases of the IGM. The vital role assumed 
by public managers in policy administration is not 
sufficiently captured by the IGR thus creating the problem 
of policy space necessitating space for the IGM use. The 
utility of the IGM is reinforced by the dynamic capacity 
using management tools and methods to solve problems 
despite legal and resource constraint escape analysis in 
the IGR. Evidently because, the IGM mechanism allows 
administrators to operate under performance partnership 
measure, building performance goal into legislation, 
establishment of standards, waiver, value and monitoring 
structures appropriately. The inability of IGR operate 
under these strain generating conditions impose on the 
federal system the necessity to adopt the IGM mechanism 
(Grover, 2008, p.133-135). More so,
whereas intergovernmental relations identifies who the actors 
are in the system and how they relate, intergovernmental 
management provides tool needed to understand how and 
why these levels interrelate the way they do and how to cope 
in the system. It is an action-oriented process that allows 
administrators at all levels the wherewithal to do something 
constructive… it allows a perspective that looks at networking 
and communications as positive ways to make things work in 
the intergovernmental system (Mandell, 1979, pp.2- 6; Marando 
& Floretano, 1992, p.297).
The term IGM implies action with problem solving 
potentials to reform the intergovernmental system to 
make it more manageable (Mandell, 1979, p.2&6). It is 
a framework that is responsive to the transient nature of 
policy coalition with various networks established for 
a particular situation but dissolved when that situation 
changes or retained as conditions permits. This is because 
IGR interactions web around it largely autonomous 
participants with variable degrees of commitment and 
dependence on each other that incites the utilization of the 
inclusive approach of the IGM that allows the integration 
of diverse interest into one policy mold. The integrative 
character of the IGM allows the IGR interactions that 
crisscross horizontally-across multi-issues and vertically-
down the intergovernmental chain (Radin, 2007, p.367). 
It is however argued that the kind of problems the IGM 
addresses does not eliminate major social problems nor 
do they lead to any substantial realignment in the federal 
system, albeit the IGM improve governance by fostering 
effective and efficient delivery of public service. This 
evidenced by the fact that behind the IGM literature lurks 
the suggestion of an ethic of good government. On this 
ground, IGM has a decidedly public administration flavor 
in its linkages of strategy and operation in the process 
of governance that allows the federal system to function 
properly (Agranof cited in Wright 2007, p.511). 
3.  AN INQUEST INTO THE APPLICATION 
OF THE IGM MECHANISM AND ITS 
IMPACT ON FEDERAL RELATIONS IN 
NIGERIA 
In a federal state like Nigeria, there are three political 
decision- making points with multiple arenas for resource 
use and responsibilities requiring collaboration. If 
these arenas of interactions are not properly ordered 
by the IGM they make policy-making budgeting and 
implementation problematic and thorny. The resultant 
complexities have severe consequences for peaceful 
federal relations. In Nigeria, this complexity was birthed 
by military unilateralism and centralization of the federal 
system by seeking to the forceful application of uniform 
standards without regard to difference in regional resource 
endowment and socio-cultural variations that were not 
amenable to Unitarianism. This made proper collaboration 
between the federal, state and local governments on 
issues of governance conflictual. This unsavory situation, 
informed scholars like Ikelegbe observation that the IGM 
process in Nigeria as poorly utilized, not goal-oriented, 
un-programmed and non-integrative as the process seems 
to have no guiding ideology/philosophy, often it is too 
personalized, self-interest and epileptic (Ikelegbe, 2004, 
p.171). The lack of a unified perspective in the I.G.M 
mechanism may have been occasioned by inadequate 
definition of the objects and patterns of transactions 
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which resulted in the lack of collaboration on overlapping 
jurisdictional dispersion programmes among disparate 
agencies and department. The absence of adequate 
coordinating machinery coupled with the piecemeal nature 
of I.G.R research are contributory factors that undermined 
Nigeria’s capacity to make the right progress (Olugbemi, 
1980, p.115). That is not to say that 
the distribution of power provokes a variety of disputes, 
between levels of government, between government at the same 
level, and between people (or peoples) and a government or 
governments. All such disputes, however, involve basic issues 
of constitutionalism: Definition and enforcements of limits upon 
governmental authority (Commelin, 2001, p.439).
In Nigeria’s case, the continued inability of the various 
units of governments to engender agreeable consensus on 
issues that have productive outcomes for the citizenry has 
become issue of public concern; as IGR interactions have 
reflected continued tensions.
There are two important dimensions of fiscal 
federalism: These are the assignment of responsibilities 
and fiscal allocation. These areas are direct the nature 
of policy–making, budgeting/fiscal allocation and 
implementation. To be specific, these areas of relations in 
the period under consideration in Nigeria have had their 
fair share of conflicts because of the various governments’ 
arbitrariness and disrespect for constitutionality. It is 
germane to observe that IGR practice during this period 
was characterized by conflicting relations among the 
executive and the legislature on the issue of budgeting, 
federal government versus state governments about the 
sharing of federal revenues, federal government and non-
oil producing states versus oil producing on the issue of 
derivation and resources control, the state governments 
and local governments on the issue of state-local 
governments joint account.
Due to the imbalance in the system the judicial 
decision of the Supreme Court could not prescribed a 
one-fit-all-solution to end the contentions rather it further 
complicated the issue of fiscal relations. This was evident 
in the increasing call for resources control by some section 
of the country. In all, fiscal relations have remained the 
most contentious in Nigeria. 
much as the judgment may have resolved a number of 
outstanding legal matters pertaining to the demands of the 
southern governors for resource control, though not to the 
total satisfaction of all the parties involved in the suit, it has 
even more fundamentally, made clear the necessity of devising 
creative political solutions, as a complement to the imperative 
of legality, in the resolution of some of the most persistent 
problems associated with the Nigeria brand of federal system of 
government (Jega, 2007, p.205).
The inability of the Supreme Court judgment of April 
5, 2002, to mitigate the heightened fiscal discontent that 
a political negotiation was instituted between the federal 
government and the oil-producing states to correct the 
legal complication that the judgment had generated. In 
the first place, political negotiation should have preceded 
judicial engagement in resolving the problem. However, 
given that the federal government wanted to continue to 
maintain the status-quo it had inherited form previous 
regime it sidelined the meditative-negotiative process of 
the IGM and rather opted for a judicial solution to resolve 
the heated fiscal allocation issue. Even though the federal 
government was latter forced to adopt a political solution 
to the on shore-offshore dichotomy as a way of containing 
the continuing agitation over the issue in the Niger Delta 
yet the issue remained unsettled (Aiyede, 2005, p.229). 
To some the issue remained unresolved because of the 
federal government high-headiness in handling the matter 
of derivation. This failure aggravated militant attack 
that continued to disrupt oil production activities due to 
the destruction of oil and gas installations and facilities, 
kidnapping of oil workers and hostage-taking (Duru, 
2009, pp.256-257; Maja-Pearce, 2013, p.63). 
Politics is in part about influencing the sharing of 
power through the process of discussion, bargaining 
and compromise in an inclusive manner (Webber, 1947, 
Laswell, 1930, Anifowose, 1999). It should not be a by-
product resorted to when conflicting situation erupts 
but an integral character of socio-political relations. At 
the heart of the political solution lies the IGM tools of 
negotiation, bargaining, persuasion and compromise 
for which the political process in Nigeria has been 
unable to appropriately utilize to effectively resolve the 
problem differences and distrust occasioned by improper 
engagement of the collective in the governance process 
(Waldt, 2001, p.91). This failure had given rise to 
subversive forces like group militancy, kidnapping in the 
Niger delta other like-form criminality across the Nigerian 
geographical space (Maja-Pearce, 2013, p.63). This 
untoward situation continues to terrorize the federal state, 
the citizenry and would be international investors. In a bid 
to find a final solution to the question of militancy that 
had undermined oil production and by extension federal 
revenue, the federal government under president Obasanjo 
resorted to the use of force which saw the demolition Udi 
community in Bayelsa state. The use of brutal force by a 
democratic government to quell a civil misunderstanding 
is indicative of government inappropriate utilization of 
the IGM approach which the political solution sought to 
utilize in solving the problem. 
Relating to item (ii) the contention is tied to the 
desire by federal government to stop over-zealous state 
governments from the arbitrary and unconstitutional 
poaching on constitutionally recognized LGs funds to 
finance their political motivated but unconstitutional 
LGs latter renamed development areas. The diversion 
of constitutionally recognized local governments’ (see 
the First Schedule, Part (1) for a comprehensive list of 
constitutionally approved LGs in Nigeria) funds resulted 
in their inability to perform their basic minimum function 
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for the people in their localities. It is sad to note that in 
Kaduna state, the state government had to intervene to 
perform the function of refuse disposal on the behalf of 
local government. Equally saddening to note is the fact 
that due to such diversion of funds, Kaduna North and 
South local governments could not pay the salaries of 
their staff for six months (Bello, 2005). It is necessary 
to note that the creation of local government as a third 
tier government by the 1976 reform was to allow the 
rural populace share fully in the development process 
through equitable access to resources, inputs and services 
by participating in the design and implementation of 
development programmes (Asogwa, 2010, p.55). But, 
due to state government poaching on LG funds and 
imposition, these lofty objective is compromised. This has 
significantly occasioned conflict between them and state 
governments (Ikeanyibe, 2009, p.316). 
The non-engagement of the people coupled with 
the abysmal performance of LGs across Nigeria is 
reflected in the poor conditions of the localities. This 
sorry situation which was unconstitutional informed 
the then President Obasanjo decision to withhold the 
funds (zero allocation) of local governments to the states 
involved in such illegality. It is apposite to note that the 
disagreement was not due to the creation of these so-
called local government or development areas but the 
diversion of the funds of constitutionally established 
local government funds to finance illegal institutions. 
The zero allocation was to stop such refractions [Lagos, 
Kaduna and Kano states are a case in point]. The later 
decision by the Obasanjo’s administration to make direct 
allocation of funds to the LGs was not only morally right 
but was welcomed by the local people. The intention 
was to safeguard the autonomy of those LGs as well as 
strengthen their capacity to improve the socio-economic 
conditions of the rural populace. This action by the 
federal government, although applauded by people was 
seen by affected state governors as an attack on their 
authorities; much more so, a meddling by the federal 
government in their internal affairs. The argument 
supporting state interference in local government affair 
by those governors was that the 1999 federal constitution 
empowered the states that LGs are a creation of state 
governments. This authority has been used by the states 
to the disadvantage of local governments. 
The increase in the minimum wage of civil servants 
for which the federal, states and labour unions were part 
of the negotiation latter became another thorny issue in 
state-federal relations. Some see the enactment of the 
new minimum wage as a form of imposition which the 
ideal of the IGM. This view may not be true, because the 
enactment of the minimum wage was the culmination 
of long period of interface between the various labour 
unions and the state. Hence the outcry by the state that 
they were not fully involved only evidenced their lack 
of sincerity. The governors’ argument that the decision 
of the federal government to raise minimum wage 
without a corresponding increase in federal allocation to 
finance such increment did not take into consideration its 
implication on the finances of the states was dainty. The 
whole contention now boiled down to lack of consultation 
with the states. If such consultation had taken place the 
federal government would have been intimated of the 
states inability to finance the increased wage bill and 
still maintain the provision of other essential services 
(James & Akintola, 2012, pp.134-135). This argument 
was however not true, it was only a crafty and deceptive 
tactic by the state government to see if they can stampede 
or cajole the federal government to increase their revenue 
allocation share or possibly alter the revenue sharing 
formula in their favour.
Another area of presumed poor-utilization of the IGM 
mechanism between organs of the federal government can 
be seen in the way federal budgeting had been conducted 
in constant disagreement. The federal budget mirrors 
in a nutshell the sum-total of the various governments 
policy choice expected to be implemented if legitimized 
a specified time. Given the sensitivity of the budget 
document it is expected that there should be a constant 
liaison between the executive and the legislature from 
its initiation to implementation unfortunately that was 
not the case. The lack of liaison between the legislature 
and the executive at the federal and state level had often 
resulted in unnecessary tussle and disagreement as to 
what the total budgetary sum should be. Such twist and 
turns coupled with the accompanying bickering had 
resulted in budget approval delay with consequence for 
poor implementation. Equally related to challenging the 
process was the desire by some members of the executive 
to conceal the padding of their budgeted estimates while 
for the legislature, it was the desire to have a fair share 
of the loot concealed in the padded budget estimate. It 
was for this reasons that the budget document both at the 
federal and state level was eclipsed by acrimony.
Consequently, the annual budget was subjected to 
many amendments during its life, in effect, it was often 
difficult to know what the approved budget was, and 
what was being implanted (Abubakar & Okongwu, 2008, 
p.252). The growing acrimony over the budget between 
the two arms of government evidenced the absence of 
proper interface and partnership necessary to balance 
the budget in order to effect speedy approval and proper 
implementation. It is widely acknowledged that no other 
issue has in the past seven years generated much conflict 
between the National Assembly and the executive as 
the appropriation exercise (Okanya, 2009, p.134). The 
upshot of this kind of continued bickering only mirrored 
the inappropriate use of the IGM mechanism that had 
resulted in the abuse of due process and the deepening of 
fiscal conflict. 
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Due to the lack of collaboration some ministers 
engaged themselves in bribing legislators to ensure that 
their padded budget estimates were not tempered with by 
the legislators. The revelation of this unwholesome act 
occasioned the dismissal of one federal minister Fabian 
Osuji during this period. The federal minister protested 
his sack, saying that such behaviours were common to 
all levels of government. The members of education 
committees of the two houses were indicted while the 
senate president, Wabara later resigned after president 
Obasanjo accused him of accepting #15 million bribe 
from the sacked minister (Onyishi & Eme, 2009, p.180). 
This unwholesome act would have been absolutely 
unnecessary in a situation where there had been the 
appropriate utilization of the IGM tools. 
The essence of adopting and maximizing the utility 
of the IGM methodology is to breed healthier federal 
relations. Its full application does not necessarily eradicate 
conflict but it does minimize it. Through the use of 
negotiation, dialogue and consensus building as means 
of handling political conflict there is the acceptance 
of opposing dissent voices that often emerge in IGR 
(Ibeanu & Egwu, 2007, p.13). Such acceptance generates 
openness, and openness engenders understanding and 
public acceptability thereby legitimizes government. 
The IGM is to engender understanding as matters are at 
least brought to the table for open for deliberation and 
consensus-building by parties concerned. The capacity of 
all concerned to go through the motion of participating 
in deciding on issue of public relevance enhances better 
understanding and collaboration for development.
It is process is necessary, given that some units of 
government i.e. local governments alone cannot with 
their meager funds meet public demands in their locality 
alone. This inability makes it mandatory to incorporate 
other contributing hands in functional relationship 
so as to facilitate the execution of local projects and 
programs. This kind of participatory governance that 
embraces social actors in shaping and determining public 
policy creates a lively and productive synergy between 
civil and political society (Ackerman, 2002 as cited in 
Ibeanu and Egwu, 2007, p.13). On the contrary however, 
the disposition of state governments to superimpose 
candidates has eroded the local government the viable 
opportunity to benefit from this kind of beneficial public-
private partnership. Similarly, imposition often erode 
the citizens of those local entities the opportunity of 
electing the right leaders whose purpose of governing 
does not have policy dichotomy with that of the people’s 
needs (Onah, 1995, p.49). These factors have not only 
combined to undermine the autonomy but render local 
government ineffective in Nigeria. 
The IGM mechanism allows governance at all levels 
to draws on broad strategies of resource mobilization and 
utilization across the public-private boarder. The focus 
on civil society and other organizations involvement 
in governance process typify the expansion of the 
democratic space. Similarly, the relationship with groups 
provides veritable source of ideas, legitimation and 
feedback for government from its society. It is also makes 
administration less remote from the citizens (Guy & 
Pierre, 2007, p.3). This integrative approach to governance 
directs and tailors development in line with popular 
demand, while eradicating the forceful application and 
consumption of public goods on the whole community. 
The act of involvement is indicative of the value 
government has for the divergent groups represented. By 
this inclusiveness and integration, civil society and the 
people see developmental initiative and governance as 
their own; as such, do not only pay special attention to 
ensure they succeed but correspondingly protect whatever 
project located in their to their communities. This form of 
state-citizen linkage promotes 
the building of civil society, foster participatory democracy, 
encouraging facilitative democracy, and empower participatory 
governance for citizens. As it is expected that the problem 
of elitist nature of democratic institutions and their lack of 
accountability can be overcome through building vibrant robust 
civil society that can mobilize citizens to make claims, play 
a watchdog role and serve as a countervailing power against 
the state. In this way, it is possible to promote the interfaceof 
the tripod of state, civil society and the private sector while 
simultaneously strengthening the supply side of the state and the 
demand side of civil society (Ibeanu & Egwu, 2007, pp.12-13).
This amiable political environment enables productive 
human enterprise to thrive; which in turn bolster national 
development. Equally too, this form of engagement is 
essential because the constitution cannot spell out all 
relations in a federal system and that the division of 
duties and responsibilities cannot be absolute (Okoli & 
Onah, 2002, p.257). In which case, public administration 
functions are so mixed that collaboration rather than 
competition is crucial and inevitable to move the federal 
state forward. This invoke that
a strong need for federal–state interactions in respect 
of practically every aspect of governmental work and a 
consequential increase in the number and frequency of meetings 
and conferences involving political actors and administrators 
(Okoli & Onah, 2002). 
It is however noticeable that in such meetings, 
representatives of the federal government seek assume 
leader role. This posture contradicts Wheare’s (1953) 
theoretical ideal of federalism which postulates that each 
unit to be coordinate to one another (Okoli & Onah, 
2002, p.256). The unwillingness of federal officials to 
be coordinate in status with subnational officials has 
unleashed and exacerbated the problems of competing 
loyalty and power relation (Okoli, 2004, p.297) that has 
deepened the divide in IGR interactions.
The inappropriate use of the IGM tools in some 
instances as observed above has over the years deprived 
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ordinary Nigerians the benefits living in a polity with less 
strain and conflicts. The less than appreciable utilization 
of the IGM mechanism to resolve the governance and 
relational issues in Nigeria’s federal system is not due 
to government’s ignorance of its value. Its refraction is 
a however a conscious and crafty design by the various 
units of government to protect their special interest 
which continues to give them special advantages in IGR 
interactions. For the federal government, her interest is 
to perpetuate the centralization of fiscal resources. This 
gives her a towering control and capacity to manipulate 
and influence the political behaviours of subnational 
governments in Nigeria. On the part of the states, the 
presence of the clause that states that local governments 
are product of their creation have been used by the state 
government under the guise of enforcing external control 
to interfere in affairs of LGs as well as poach on their 
meager funds. This unlawful act is easily committed 
through the State-local government joint account (Roberts, 
1997, p.63 & 1999, p.258).
On the whole, the deliberate desire of the various tiers 
of government not to properly account to the citizenry 
has made them to underplay the effective application 
of the IGM methodology in IGR interactions. By this 
refraction, it has resulted in the negation of the purpose 
of government, which is, the conscious management of 
the public resources for the common good. Focusing on 
protecting the common good is reinforced by popular 
participation, accountability and transparency (World 
Bank as cited in Ibeanu & Egwu, 200, p.16). The less 
than appreciable use of the IGM mechanism during this 
period had severely undermined collaboration, genuine 
compromise and consensus-building necessary for 
integrating appropriately the interest of the different 
units of government, the various governments and the 
citizenry, and between the different ethnicities. This 
is essential for to reducing significantly the barrage 
of socio-economic and political conflicts currently 
undermining development and Nigeria’s federalism. 
These have not helped us to build the caliber of 
supportive constituencies required to resist a determined 
effort to upstage it (Kayode, 2007, p.68). 
This is due to leadership suicism and insensitivity in 
dealing with the issue-areas that are of public concern in 
an open and beneficial manner to every Nigerian. By this 
less than appreciable effort, the government is unable to 
effectively incorporate and meet the needs of the various 
groups in Nigeria. This is a sneb on the operator of state 
power as they had failed to order things right. Under this 
environment, it is impossible to have a pattern of IGR that 
will permit the federal system to transcend peacefully so as 
to impact positively on the citizenry. All other efforts at state 
transformation without putting this aspect of state relations 
in order is like coupling a machine without the right nuts and 
bolts; the result is that system preform optimal . 
CONCLUSION 
The inability of the government to incorporate the IGR 
interactions the IGM mechanism have deter the ability 
of the different tiers of government to make a major 
refocusing at confronting the modern problems of 
managing the contemporary federal system (Marando 
& Florestano, 1992, p.309). The capacity of IGR to 
resolve emerging conflicts and disagreements in a 
harmonious manner such that it will impact positively 
on the competence of the various constitutionally limited 
governments is placed on the anvil of the IGM. The 
capacity of the IGM to manage the divergences that 
results from the daily fallout of relationships will depend 
on how the IGM mechanisms are truly utilized in a 
manner perceived to be open and without compulsion. 
Utilizing the IGM mechanism appropriately is an 
indispensable building-block for not only promoting 
understanding but make the IGR interactions both 
participatory and fruitful. It also diminishes the 
formal command and control pattern of relationships 
that undermined easy resolution of conflicts, quick 
de terminat ion  of  pol ic ies  and speedy program 
implementation. It is valuable instrument for strengthening 
the alliance between program specialist and professionals 
that transcend levels of government they serve. The IGM 
allows the inclusion of private hands in the governance 
process which hitherto were excluded and it did not allow 
the IGR to connect well with the new experiential realities 
of federal governance. Entrenching the utilization of IGM 
mechanism in IGR interactions is the basis for building a 
lasting understanding and trust between the various tiers 
of government and civil society in governance process. 
This will stimulates genuine and not pseudo participation 
in governance as role differentiation is understood and 
adhered to in accordance with the dictate of the rule of 
law. Adhering to the IGM mechanism will significantly 
help in stabilizing the polity and guarantee the use of 
public resource for the benefit of the people. 
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